This sense of quantum leap associated with the trials and tribulations of the campaign against apartheid exposes the amnesia of popular memory that forgets, or is encouraged to forget, each generation's action to constrain state power -be it on the waterfront in 1890, the mines, railways and wharves in 1912 and 1913, the dole queue in 1932, or the waterfront again in 1951. It also ignores the tensions of the 1970s and 1980s, and the widespread social protest they provoked. The New Right ravages of the Fourth Labour Government have overshadowed all but the near civil war of 1981. A key element of this 'overshadowing' is that the power of the consensus around the New Right drive begun under the Fourth Labour Government and continued through more recent National Party and Coalition governments has embedded the notion that there is no alternative -opposition to the framework seems either futile or utopian, or both. The intensity and relentlessness of the New Right drive and the associated sense of powerlessness is accompanied by a sense of betrayal by Labour held by many in the oppositional movements who believed they shared a vision of liberal egalitarianism or social democracy with the Labour Party.
3 Embodied in this imaginary shared vision, was a reliance on the state to act as an agent of the transformation sought by dissident politics. 4 There is a nostalgia on the liberal-left about the period before 1984 when it is held that there was a vision of something different, when oppositional forces had not been incorporated into state structures, or crushed by the less fettered power of the consensus of the powerful.
Only the campaign against apartheid sport has risen above the blandness of pre-1984 politics to stand out. The anti-apartheid activity of 1981 was the zenith of a sixty year era of discontent at sporting contact between New Zealand and South Africa. The discontent between 1921 and the mid 1960s was largely expressed as a sense that the New Zealand Rugby Football Union was effectively importing apartheid by agreeing not to select Maori players for tours to South Africa. In 1960 the anti-tour movement's central slogan was 'No Maoris (sic) No Tour'.
Starting in 1949 voices began to be raised against the practice of apartheid in South Africa.
By the time the All Blacks toured South Africa in 1970 with three Maori and one Samoan player in the team the campaign was organised around the demand for the total sporting isolation of apartheid. Despite these sixty years of opposition, little had prepared New Zealand for the intensity and extent of protest in 1981. The tour had came to represent all that was wrong with the country: the arrogance of the political leadership, the pattern and effects of colonial dispossession, the maintenance of patriarchal power. Most of all, opponents saw the tour as representing an elite that seemed to be endorsing apartheid as legitimate.
The opposition campaign was potent because of rugby's metonymical role in Aotearoa/New
Zealand. Critical analyses of New Zealand rugby have held it to embody the nation as a Pakeha masculine entity. 5 These analyses have focused on rugby as the sport as a site of national celebration and valorization, the continuation of a masculinist frontier ethos, or the outcome of a particular pattern of colonization. Regimes of cultural power in Aotearoa/New
Zealand are fully imbricated with rugby union. Rugby is seen as significant, if not instrumental, in building the nation. The character and ability claimed as the arbiters of national membership are tested only in competition with other nations: usually in sport or in war. In one view of New
Zealand history the young colony proved its mettle against the home countries during the 1905
All Black tour of Britain, and gained maturity on the battlefield at Gallipoli in 1915. Sport is a worthy substitute for war and a precursor for the national worthiness the war proves, whilst also preparing young men for combat. In the years before 1987 and the launching of the the Rugby World Cup began, and international series between New Zealand and South Africa was held by many to be the world championship of rugby. In both New Zealand and South Africa, rugby union was the game of the dominant group and was seen to encapsulate the characterisitics and traits of nationhood.
This view of a national past connects with a yearning for the pre-1984 conditions to build a more specific nostalgia that sees the events of the tour as necessary. It is this sense of the necessary that is linked to the tour-as-maturation analysis. This sense that the tour was necessary for national maturation was clearly revealed during the 1994 Springbok tour. In 1981 the Springboks had a special relationship with the Waikato provincial rugby team.
Having lost the first game to Waikato in 1956, the South Africans saw the game in 1981 as the chance for revenge. It was as if the Springbok victory over Waikato in 1965 had been forgotten. That desire remained unfulfilled as an occupation of the rugby field by protesters lead to the game being cancelled. The first big match of the tour had been prevented and the resulting turmoil exposed a schism in attitudes to rugby and nation. Writing in 1994 of the 1981 cancellation, a week before the Springboks were due to play Waikato for the first time in 29 years, Gilbert Wong noted that "Godzone was redefined that day." Other commentators and participants are not so specific about the cancellation of the Waikato game as Wong and Evans preferring to see a wider and more complex series of changes running through and resulting from the events of the tour. For some, the effects of the tour are conservative. Former Police officer and National Party Member of Parliament Ross Meurant argues that the tour "was probably a force for good. The turmoil was the price we had to pay at the time for the preservation of democracy as New Zealand knows it."
8 Journalist Tony Reid suggested this complexity when he argued that "the sheer scale of the Springbok tour disruption permanently altered psychological and tactical relationships between the state, the rugby world, the wider citizenry and the police." 9 The key and problematic word in this assessment is 'permanently' in that Reid undermines the amnesia of the popular by immediately stating that the 1981 tour was, in this sense, similar to the effects of the 1951 Waterfront Lockout. The widespread view is that these changes are caused by or result from the tour, and seem to link to a quest for an origin or a spark. A more historically informed assessment of the era would expose the tour as a concentration of the conditions that promoted this series of changes, but would not and could not use the tour as the explanation.
Although the quest for origins is not in and of itself nostalgic, there is a sense of glorying attached to the events of the winter of '81. Meurant, considering his time as senior member of the Red Group, a special unit travelling with the Springbok party, has described the tour as "halcyon days" pointing to the sense of "togetherness" and "team spirit' within the unit. 10 It is worth noting, however, that not all share this glorying and some are contemptuous of it. From the other side of the gap between police and protester, Wellington Marshalls' Committee convenor Alick Shaw resisted the tendency to reminisce noting that "the nostalgia of the returned protester is even more tedious than that of the returned soldier, and with rather less justification". 11 Shaw reflected more openly a tendency running through comments by many in the protest leadership during this ten years after recap. There is a sense that the scale and intensity was something that developed unwillingly, that the times were difficult and that there were so many other things that could have been done during that time. Central to this is a rejection of the sense that these were the good old days, the 'wasn't it great' element of the nostalgia of the returned protester Shaw implies.
Although every twenty to thirty years Pakeha New Zealand has taken action against excessively exercised state or class power, the events of 1981 are a break from earlier patterns of political struggle and resistance. There are four distinguishing characteristics:  the events follow a longer period of activism than had previously been the case;
 the campaign was not run by trade unions focusing explicitly on working people's concerns;  women were actively involved in organising and leading anti-tour action, not in the 'ladies auxiliary', while raising and gaining support for feminist concerns in a broader political movement; and  the campaign saw the active involvement of Maori at all levels and a growing focus on colonial relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand.
Interpretation of the nostalgic view and perception of maturity is aided by a consideration of Europe in 1989. Events during this year saw a growing debate and awareness about the meaning and significance of history.
Building on these European events, in 1992 Francis Fukuyama published his celebration of capitalism, 'The End of History and the Last Man'.
12 Fukuyama argues that collapse of the Soviet Union represented the defeat of socialism and the victory of capitalist power. It was the end of a 200 year struggle and an absolute victory for capitalism. As the 'defeat of communism' allowed liberal capitalism to be constructed as the only viable model for social
and economic organisation, History ended. Fukuyama recently has argued that the collapse of communism proves the fundamental error of the left -the assumption that equality is both a desirable objective and proof of historical progress. His argument now is that inequality is the motor of progress because it both drives the capitalist economy and is 'right'.
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Fukuyama's declaration of the End of History now seems as premature as the often This anti-apartheid movement, the most intense of those dissident campaigns, reached its zenith in 1981 when countless people took to the streets to oppose sporting contact with South Africa. As expected, protest activity took place in the major centres -but the stories abound of the dozen or so people who marched in Eltham on July 3, or the ten in Kaikohe on May 1.
Before the tour began, the anti-tour movement tapped the 51% opposition to the tour, according to an early July Heylen public opinion poll. 23 There was enormous confidence and genuine belief within the anti-tour movement that the tour would be stopped, if the movement remained disciplined and focused on the objective. Hamilton anti-apartheid activist Mike Law spoke for many at the May 1981 HART, the New Zealand Anti-Apartheid Movement, National
Council meeting -"I'm convinced we're going to win this one, provided we don't drop the ball in next few months".
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This confidence lasted until the police attack on protesters in Wellington's Molesworth St on July 29th. This brought the realisation that the tour would not be stopped, but it could be disrupted, police resources would be stretched to breaking point and no tour would ever happen again. Molesworth Street was a sign of changing police tactics.
By August 1 in the provincial centre of Palmerston North, the army had joined the police in ensuring no rugby grounds were invaded again.
There was a widespread feeling that the campaign against the tour was part of something bigger. There had been a series of major anti-government campaigns over the previous five years, Muldoon's National Party government was increasingly unpopular and looked certain to loose the 1981 election -despite the year long electoral campaign involving a royal tour and the visit of the Springboks. Even staunch and long term National Party supporters were turning against Muldoon and his 'style', which many found objectionable in contrast to the recollected image of former Party leaders Keith Holyoake and John ('Gentleman' Jack)
Marshall. Significantly, the breadth of opposition gave rise to a widespread feeling that change was possible: campaigns against apartheid and for improved reproductive rights for women, increasing awareness of Maori colonial dispossession, and demands for improved social services were all premised on a notion of improved equality and precisely and explicitly reject the argument the inequality is the key to progress.
Despite this sense of progress through a quest for egalitarianism, deficiencies remained in the broader progressive movement. Alongside the colonial and gender based gaps within the various dissident trends of the 1970s was its increasing isolation from the trade union movement. This isolation from trade unions can be seen as part explanation for the longevity 23 Geoff Chapple 1981: The Tour Auckland A W & A H Reed, 1984. pp 42, 43, 50-51. 24 Chapple 1981 p 43 of this period of political struggle. Distinction between these socio-political struggles and the trade union movement meant that the various campaigns, during the period the Labour was in opposition, generally avoided the constraints of 'Labourism' and electoralism. At the same time, though, there was a general failure to develop a class analysis of events and to involve working class organisations or people. This was to prove fatal to these campaigns once Labour came to power.
By 1981, although the leadership of the trade union movement called for opposition to the tour, workers' support for this position remained weak. The exception to this is in the Wellington where a strong activist union membership had been active in broader social movements for several years. During 1981 a number of factory committees against the tour were formed, mainly in Wellington's Hutt Valley. A number of those involved in these committees went on to become leading anti-tour activists. 25 The other key exception, although less obvious that Wellington, was in Auckland where an organized leftist union leadership was able to build some working class supprt of rthe anti-tour campoaign, and the Trade Union
Centre was the headquarters for the anti-tour coalition. A more general trade union response was seen in late February 1981 when the National Union of Railwaymen had announced its opposition to the tour and stated that its members would not provide any support for the touring party. Within three weeks NUR branches in Tauranga, Gisborne, Ashburton, Stratford, Lower Hutt, Hawera, New Plymouth, Timaru and Christchurch had either dissociated themselves from the national position or opposed it. 26 The NUR was not alone in its isolation from the anti-tour movement: the 9000 members of the Canterbury Branch of the Engineers Union, the largest affiliate of the Federation of Labour, opposed any moves to 'interfere' with the tour.
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They were joined in this position by the Auckland branch of the Allied Liquor Trade Workers'
Union which rejected the FoL stance.
28
While the Engineers' Union was one of the most conservative unions, the NUR had a tradition of strong action on a broad range of issues, as did the Drivers' Union. Yet even within this more militant group there was considerable support for the tour. After a strong anti-tour vote in 1980, a similar resolution in 1981 saw considerable debate within the Wellington Branch and a much closer vote. Branch Secretary Jackson Smith described the supporters of the tour as "quite a hefty number" although the resolution attracted a clear majority. This division exposed two tendencies within the trade union movement. The first was the trade union abandonment of mass action and the politics of class struggle. In the second, the resulting concentration on legislatively constrained industrial instruments meant that there was a basic failure to confront broader cultural issues or cultural politics. As a result, other than in Wellington and to alesser degree Auckalnd, anti-tour debates within the trade union movement were played out in terms largely defined by a wider polity and encapsulated a non class-specific position on the tour. The outcome was a trade union movement isolated from the anti-apartheid movement and a weakened anti-tour campaign.
The campaign against the tour, however, saw the assertion of a public political persona and Maori women and lesbians criticised elements of the movement in ways heard in other first world nations. Women's liberation was seen to be colour blind assuming that Maori and Pakeha women shared common interests that were more significant than the differences between them. The intense focus on issues of race and racism, and the passions these generated through the involvement with rugby union, created an environment conducive to a more comprehensive assessment of New Zealand's colonial experience, and the position of Maori in contemporary society. It also coincided with a shift in political focus from issues abroad to those at home. Increasingly high rates of unemployment and an ongoing economic crisis, growing concern about nuclear testing and the presence of US nuclear vessels in New
Zealand waters and other existential concerns combined to make the campaign against the 1981 tour the last mass movement dealing primarily with issues outside New Zealand. A dynamic focus on colonial relations brought political struggle home in a way that had not been seen before 1981.
As the crisis of the final years of the Muldoon government intensified there was a change in perspective among key elements of the Pakeha protest movement leadership. Writers associated with the magazine The Republican attempted a theoretical and practical meshing of ideas of Maori sovereignty with Western Marxism.
49
The formerly Maoist Workers'
Communist League, the second largest Marxist grouping in the country and influential in a number of social movements, abandoned the Leninist notion that a single party could lead the revolutionary struggle in favour of a coalition of forces united around a programme addressing contradictions based in capitalism, colonialism and patriarchal dominance. 50 surrounding the tour challenged the hegemonic identities New Zealand had adopted and, at least during the final Muldoon years, prepared fertile ground for intensified protest actions.
Despite these shifts on the left, the key factor in the changing dynamic and impact of the dissident networks was increasing support from the Labour Party, which lost the 1981 election by one seat, and could smell victory. Labour gave support to a number of movements, especially those around reformist feminism and anti-nuclear politics. Labour's 1984 election victory provided the impetus for a resurgence of 'Labourist' politics in the dissident groups where the 'don't rock the boat' attitude demobilised dissent and undermined resistance to Labour's New Right agenda. Kelsey has convincingly argued that it was only the political imperative to resolve the historical claims against breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi that undermined that political-economic drive. 51 Despite this, the focus on historical claims itself has effectively demobilised Maori anti-colonial politics.
For the purposes of considering events in regard to the Springbok tour, protest movements in some other areas are significant. Rising discontent around environmental issues, especially the campaign around the National Party's 1981 election strategy -Think Big, contributed to the sense of struggle against growing state power and totalitarianism. This sense was fed by campaigns against significant other National Party legislation that increased the power of the state. Legislation in 1976 and 1978 weakened the ability of trade unions to protect workers, in 1977 strengthened the Security Intelligence Service, and in 1980 the National Development Act gave the government the power to over-ride public consultation requirements for planning permission. These moves came on top of dawn raids on Pacific Islanders' homes in the quest for immigration permit overstayers, and built on a widespread sense that dissent was no longer tolerated. 52 The era saw increasing trade union campaigns and mass public protest around cuts to social programmes, especially education funding, that fed into a sense of national crisis. The economy was seen to be troubled with rising unemployment, stagflation and declining living standards with an ineffectual policy response. Crucially for many, even its traditional supporters, the government was seen to have no way out of the crisis choosing instead to mount a series of populist campaigns, around gangs, welfare 'cheats', 'subversives'
and others, instead of effective policy initiatives. The anti-apartheid movement built on this growing sense of discontent and struggle. The profile and significance of rugby union is crucial to an effective understanding of the high profile of this component of dissident politics. Rugby union is an integral part of New Zealand's national identity situated at the nexus of strands involving the maintenance of colonial power, a sustained hegemonic masculinity operating through both patriarchal and fratriarchal sites, common-sense capitalist rationality and generational dominion. Rugby union is imbued with traits valued by the discursive codes privileged by these modalities.
The social relations of rugby continue to assert this hegemonic role in such a way as to make both rugby and the nation sacred. Despite its ambiguous relationship with other identities of both modernity and post-modernity, the nation exercises considerable moral and emotional sway over self-imagining. The identification of the All Blacks as nationally representative in all ways when combined with rugby watching as a scopophilic activity serves to fetishise both the nation and the characteristics with which rugby is imbued. The All Blacks are thus both totemic and fetishistic. These processes conflate to grant rugby in general and the All Blacks in particular a sacrosanct position in the iconography of New Zealand.
Rugby's significant role in New Zealand's received hegemonic national identity and the traditional importance placed on competition with South Africa combine to make attendance at All Black-Springbok matches akin to visiting the temple. This secular sacredness meant that these contests needed to be isolated from the profane world of politics and the sacrilege of those who would challenge those identities. By the end of the 1970s, the doubters of these identities had been granted voice and were being listened to. Against this cultural assault, the defence of rugby contact with South Africa protected the highest manifestation of national, totemic identity assertion, and restated the value of the received version of national imagining against those agnostics and heretics who would challenge its veracity. It was the strength of the conviction of those who would defend the traditions that made the 1981 tour protests so intense. Tour opponents had made the tactical decision that the tour could be stopped so set out to do just that, while tour defenders saw it as the last stand against blasphemy. It was the polyvalent nature of that tradition, and the deeply ingrained place of rugby within the national and masculine imagining, that allowed that political struggle to stand in for a much wider set of social and political changes.
In seeking to stop the tour the anti-apartheid movement was striking a blow at New Zealand's : London. 1985. pp 268-195 . The significance of these arguments lies in the proportion of this generation within the PMC. The different economic and class structure in New Zealand means that the parallels should be cautiously assumed, but the structural and class cultural implications of the argument suggest provocative questions for our historical analysis and understanding of the post-war era. 54 These campaigns, referred to above, included protests against New Zealand involvement in the Vietnam War, around environmental causes, and for a nuclear-free New Zealand. By the later 1970s, campaigns and struggles had developed around issues of colonisation, and as a result of the women's movement. Significant protest movements developed around unemployment and a raft of other social policy concerns while increasing state power attracted broad based pubic opposition movements. 55 There are several useful accounts of the development of the anti-apartheid movement. that the increasingly unpopular Muldoon government was using the tour as an election tool it seems that wide ranging frustration had laid the basis for a well supported protest movement.
During the 1970s, opposition to sporting contact remained limited in New Zealand. The common-sensical ideology that sport and politics were separate had wide support, and the cultural significance of rugby made these tours a crucial event for many New Zealand men. New Zealand's self-satisfied complacency that it was still the world's social laboratory, that it had the best race relations in the world, and that women had little about which to complain had been questioned, but little else had happened to shake those beliefs. Throughout the later 1970s, however, the questioning grew louder and in some specific areas, particularly regarding colonial and patriarchal relations, actions defied those certainties. The antiapartheid movement still had a small core of activists, primarily in the main centres, but there was an increasingly sympathetic constituency for its message. The factors Pearson identifies as preventing action against the 1956 tour -the dominance of rugby in the national self-image, latent racism that made apartheid tolerable, and lack of appreciation for anti-colonial and Black nationalist feeling -had been weakened. 58 Rugby certainly remained a crucial element in the hegemonic national identity, but increasingly public discussion of racism in New Zealand, and By the end of the 1970s, the campaign against contact with apartheid combined a number of elements facilitating broad support. It retained a strong focus on an international issue while also prioritising 'race' as the basic contradiction. Furthermore, the most high profile target of the campaign was rugby union. In combining these dynamics, the anti-apartheid movement could draw support from those concerned about matters of international concern, women critical of patriarchal and fratriarchal cultural mores, and Maori seeking to focus on issues of domestic racism as well as build support for black struggles. In addition, the growing international isolation of apartheid and the increasingly strong boycott movement increased the number of sportspeople opposing contact, albeit often from self-interest. Others were concerned that New Zealand was increasingly out of step with world opinion and risked becoming a pariah, especially in a world where market diversity was crucial for an exporting nation. Finally, the tour was to held in an election year: an election it was widely expected National would lose. In a climate where even traditional supporters were turning away from National in favour of third parties, the irony of this political use of sport was apparent to many.
Simply, 1981 was a period of intense social tension with the Springbok tour focusing widespread discontent on a single event.
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This singular focus is crucial to understanding the consequences of the anti-tour movement. supported positions advanced by the African National Congress. The upshot of the November meeting was weakened non-sectarianism and a weakened movement. The second, and in the long term more difficult, debate was the issue of 'domestic racism'. Maori and other supporters of the anti-tour campaign became increasingly frustrated at a perceived failure by the anti-apartheid movement to confront issues arising from a national colonial past. Looking back after ten years, Alick Shaw noted this problem when he noted the movement's singularity:
"It was set up as a single issue organisation, not a political movement. You couldn't just take these thousands of people and turn their attention to domestic racism or whatever."
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Shaw's observations direct attention to the problems of campaigns to come. Although the anti-tour campaign was important in raising issues about New Zealand's race relations and colonial history, it was neither solely responsible nor was it sufficient to promote or provoke a political movement. In some ways it was easier to consider the question of apartheid: there was less involved in terms of a (re)examination of identity that would result from a reassessment of national history required by a political movement addressing issues of domestic racism.
62
Subsequent political struggles ranged across a number of issues with the most consistently high profile being the question of colonial relations. The symbol and focus of this struggle, the Treaty of Waitangi, became equated with the totality of the issue, and the high profile of historical grievances has directed focus to those concerns. However, the vibrancy of political debate and struggle in the immediate post-tour period promised far more in terms of changing colonial relations. In effect and in popular memory, the anti-tour campaign was, as has been said of May 1968, "a turning point in history where history refused to turn: as a beacon of the future it revealed nothing so vividly as the past." 63 Memory of that past, of that promise and of its potential for change has been expunged as the demobilisation of politics allowed and cause by the New Right's Borg-like ravages where resistance seems futile has further sapped 61 Kate Coughlan et al 'Battle of the Boks' 62 The extensive literature and intensity of cultural and political debate concerning the effects of moves to address historical grievances under the Treaty of Waitangi is testament to the difficulties of reassessing a national history and the orthodoxy of identity it has produced. These same difficulties were exposed by the outrage expressed by many in letters to the editor columns and elsewhere after the the potential of campaigns of struggle and the quest for equality. As the vision Fukuyama represents retains its social and political power and as Neithammer's call to historical action is squeezed as a political option, the dual nostalgias that view of the campaign in 1981 as containing either the potential for the rebirth or the actual end of Aotearoa/New Zealand history are exposed as a denial of both the historicity of the 1950s and the nature of post-1984 politics and history.
